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The work investigates the inuene of leader's strategy on opinion formation in artiial networked
soieties. The strength of the soial inuene is assumed to be ditated by distane from one agent to
another, as well as individual strengths of the agents. The leader is assumed to have muh greater
resoures, whih allows him to tune the way he inuenes the other agents. We study various
strategies of using these resoures to optimize the onditions needed to `onvine' the whole soiety
to leader's opinion. The exibility of the model allows it to be used in studies of politial, soial
and marketing inuene and opinion formation.
1. MODELING OPINION FORMATION IN
AGENT BASED COMPUTER MODELS
Our previous study (Paper I, [1℄) has presented results
of omputer simulations within the model rst proposed
by Nowak et al. [2℄, developed further by Nowak and
Lewenstein [3℄ and Kaperski and Hoªyst [4, 5℄, Hoªyst
et al. [6℄. The model onerns the formation of publi
opinion through interations between individual mem-
bers of the soiety, taking into aount dierenes in re-
eptiveness, strength of inuene and preexisting biases.
The original work [2℄ has shown, using omputer simula-
tions, that interesting marosopi behaviour an result
from simple mirosopial interating agent model. The
reent advanes in understanding the nature of many so-
ial systems, inluding human soieties and assoiations
suh as sienti ollaborations, information exhange fo-
rums and tehniques (e.g. WWW sites), friendship and
aquaintane networks or nets of sexual ontats show re-
markable network properties [7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14℄.
It is then natural to apply the network paradigm to the
study of opinion establishment in soieties.
The basis for the models used here and in Paper I
(following [2, 3, 4, 5, 6℄) is:
• A set of N interating agents forms a soiety. In-
terations take form of one to one ativities.
• Eah agent has, at a given time, his `opinion'. The
global harateristis of the behaviour of this `opin-
ion' within the soiety is the topi of the researh.
For simpliity we treat the opinion as binary+1/−1
variable.
• Eah agent is haraterized by the strength of his
possible inuene on other agents. This allows to
model situations of uneven distribution of inuene.
• One of the agents (the leader) is assumed to have
the strength of inuene muh greater than the rest
of the agents.
∗
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• Interation between partiular agents is governed
by the strength of agents as well as the soial dis-
tane between the interating agents. The umu-
lative eet of the strength and soial distane is
alled soial impat.
• The agents interat and inuene eah other in
turns, hanging their opinion after eah full turn
of interations take plae. Agents are allowed
to interat with themselves, this mimis the phe-
nomenon of self-support, or inlination to hold
agent's present opinion.
• The model allows for extra-soial inuene or bias,
applied uniformly to all agents.
• The model may allow for the noise in ommunia-
tion and hanging individual opinion by adding an
equivalent of temperature to the simulations.
Paper I studied mainly the eets related to the net-
work topology and soial separation between the agents.
In the urrent paper we propose a new formulation of
the problem of opinion formation, allowing to model
the niteness of leader's resoures and allowing dier-
ent strategies. As a result, we aim at study of how the
leader should at to maximize his inuene in networked
soieties.
We use here almost exatly the same basi framework
as in Paper I. The only hange in the formulation is in
the way the leader's inuene is introdued.
Traditional model of Nowak et al. and its extension by
Kaperski and Hoªyst has set leader's L strength sL at
onstant value. The diret inuene of the leader on any
other agent (i) was then given by
IiL = sLmiLσL, (1)
and the overall impat, inluding the external onditions
(h) and interations with other, non-leader agents is
Ii = sLmiL +
∑
j 6=L
sjmijσj + h, (2)
where σL was assumed equal to 1. This way of mea-
suring the strength may be referred to as general leader
harisma  it does not use any resoures of the leader,
2the overall eet has no limitations with inreasing soi-
ety size et. For this reason the traditional model's or-
respondene to real-life situations is rather limited. The
only `damping' of leader's inuene was ontained in the
immediaies miL, whih are onstant and thus did not
allow to introdue any `strategies' for the leaders.
We introdue here a generalized model, in whih the
leader is assumed to have nite amount of resoures W
(whih may be related, for example, to wealth or to time
available to the leader to spend with the other mem-
bers of the soiety). The leader may then use dierent
strategies of distributing the resoures to ahieve dierent
eetive strengths in interations with dierent members
of the soiety. For example, the leader may `spend' his
resoures on inuening a small ore of his immediate
neighbours, negleting the others. This would allow to
keep a luster of agents supporting leader's opinion even
in very disadvantageous onditions. On the other hand
the resoures may be used to `onvine' the key agents
(e.g. the most onneted agents in Albert-Barabási so-
iety), and use their inuene to promote leader's opin-
ion. The model is onstruted in suh a way, that `equal'
distribution of resoures by the leader among all agents
reprodues the traditional model with equal strength sL.
In our simulations we ompare results of a few general
strategies, with the aim of modeling the most eetive
use of resoures to ahieve spei aims. For example,
one of the questions is whih of the strategies is better at
seuring predened perentage of supporters within a so-
iety; another problem might be to establish whih kind
of strategy minimizes the amount of resoures needed to
onvine the whole soiety to leader's opinion in the pres-
ene of unfavorable external onditions.
2. DETAILS OF THE MODEL
As mentioned above, our model followed almost ex-
atly that of Kaperski and Hoªyst. We use the notation
onventions introdued in Paper I.
The leader resoures W may be divided into individ-
ual portions  time slots for individual meetings of a
politiian, amount of money spent on partiular form of
advertising et. To soial impat of the leader on agent
i is generalized to
IiL = siLmiLσL, (3)
where siL are individual (direted) strengths of
leader's inuene on agent i. To `ahieve' the desired
eet in interation with the target agent i by inreas-
ing the strength siL, the leader has to `spend' appropriate
amount of resoures, wi. Of ourse niteness of resoures
imposes
∑
i6=L
wi ≤W. (4)
As in Paper I it is useful to introdue here the resaled
values. The saling is given by
sRiL =
siL
Ns¯
, (5)
hR =
h
Nm¯s¯
, (6)
with averages m¯, s¯ exluding the leader.
There are many possibilities of mapping sRiL to w
R
i . In
our approah we look for a ost funtion W :
wRi =W(s
R
iL) (7)
whih would take the following onditions into aount:
• The model should redue to the traditional model
when the total resaled wealth WR is divided into
N parts (stritly speaking N − 1, but we assume
N ≫ 1). Thus W(sRL) = W
R/N , where sRL is the
resaled uniform leader's strength of the traditional
model.
• It should be inreasingly expensive to ahieve larger
and larger values of the strength sRiL, the ost fun-
tion W should be linear or supralinear. In our sim-
ulations we have tested two forms of the ost fun-
tions: linear and quadrati. Most of the results
presented here are for linear W .
• In the limit of sRiL → 0 also the orresponding ost
wRi should vanish.
The two forms of the ost funtions used in our simula-
tions were:
W
lin
(sRil ) = s
R
iL, (8)
W
quad
(sRil ) =
(sRiL)
2
sRL
(9)
The total soial impat on agent i, by all agents (in-
luding the leader and the agent itself), in terms of the
resaled values, is given by
Ii = s
R
iL
miL
m¯
B +
∑
j 6=L
sRj
mij
m¯
σjB + h
RB, (10)
where we have introdued a very useful quantity B =
Ns¯m¯, whih is the maximum value of the bakground
inuene of all non-leader agents if they all have σj =
1. We have also assumed that the `normal' agents do
not have individual resoures and that their strength of
interation is independent of the traget, that is sij ≡ sj .
2.1. Leader's strategies
The exibility of assigning wRi and therefore s
R
iL to
dierent agents i allows us to simulate dierent leader
strategies. In our simulations we have proposed the fol-
lowing proedure
3• The amount of wealth that he has at his disposal
is given by a referene traditional system of equal
distribution of strengths and osts (sRiL ≡ s
R
L),W =
NsRL .
• The leader hoses the agents he is going to on-
entrate his eorts upon. The agents are ordered
aording to their importane in the hosen strat-
egy.
• To avoid `spending' his eorts without guaran-
teed results, the leader should adjust the individ-
ual strengths sRiL in aordane with the immediay
value miL and other onditions (e.g. soial tem-
perature TR and external inuene hR. This is
ahieved through a threshold parameter t whih re-
ets the value of the leader strength toward agent
i needed (on the average) to onvine this agent.
One example of expression for t is the threshold
for strength needed to overome the ombined in-
uene of external onditions (hR) and maximum
negative impat of all non-leader agents on i. In
this ase t = 1 − hR. The leader then alu-
lates the strength needed to pass this threshold
s∗iL ≥ tm¯/miL. In some ases smaller values of t
may be used, still ensuring desired eet of leader's
interation for targeted agents. For example, in
random initial onditions it should be suient to
use t ≥ −hR.
• The leader interats with the targeted agents in or-
der of importane, eah time using up the neessary
amount of resoures wR∗i = W(∫
∗
〉L, until he runs
out of resoures. For all other agents the inuene
of the leader is assumed to be zero.
This proedure allows, for example, that at small val-
ues of the referene traditional uniform leader strength
(sRL ≪ −h
R
), for whih we have shown in Paper I that the
support for the leader is negligible, to onentrate on a
few agents to obtain a `adre' of followers. Common sense
suggests that spending the same amount of resoures on
1/10th of targets allows, on average, 10 times greater per
target expense, and following this inrease in expeted
individual results. While the inrease may not be lin-
ear, it is worth remembering that the traditional model
used resoures proportional to the number of agents in a
soiety.
The key for leader's strategy lies in the way the target
agents are hosen and ordered. We propose here a few
natural andidates for suh strategies
Neighbours rst. As we follow Paper I in the way the
immediaies mij are alulated from network dis-
tanes between agents i and j, the values of miL
derease with dereasing distane from the leader.
It follows that the ost of onvining one's lose
neighbors is the least. The total wealth an be
spend most eetively on the losest neighbours,
minimizing the expenses on `lost ases'  agents
so remote that the expense needed to fulll ondi-
tion for s∗iL is prohibitive. In this way, the leader
an assure surpassing the support threshold for a
limited luster of his neighbours. In terms of the
spatial model of Nowak, this orresponds to inu-
ening a limited irle around the leader. It is nat-
ural to expet that due to onentration of eort,
the size of the bubble (or support luster size in
abstrat spae networks) would be greater than in
the referene traditional ase.
Convining the highly onneted agents rst. In
Paper I we have shown that in sale free networks
of Albert-Barabási, if the leader is in the highly
onneted node his inuene on other agents
is muh more pronouned. Our direted eort
model allows the leaders who are not in highly
onneted nodes to proeed as follows: spend as
muh as neessary on the highly onneted agents
(regardless if they are in lose neighbourhood or
not), and then ount that the ombined inuene
of these agents would serve as a vehile of leader's
opinion.
Mixed strategy: top inueners plus the rest. A
ombination of the previous strategies. The targets
of leader's attention are just a few of the most im-
portant agents (dened as in previously presented
strategies), and then the remaining resoures are
spent on all other agents. This allows the leader
to be sure that while no agent would be entirely
without leaders inuene (e.g. through media), the
key ators would be `personally' ontated with
appropriate resoures. We have investigated three
variants of this strategy, with emphasis on the
losest neighbours, most onneted or strongest
agents.
2.2. Results
The rst striking ontrast between the results of any
direted strategy simulation and the results of the tra-
ditional approah, is linear growth of the perentage of
the population that the leader's supporters form with the
inrease of the resoures available, measured by sRL . This
is due to linear growth in the number of agents `person-
ally inuened and onvined'. While in the traditional
model, for sRL ≪ −h
R
the number of supporters was near
zero, here, due to the way the resoures are used, the
leader an `guarantee' the support of the agents he uses
the resoures on. In our simulations we have uset the
threshold t = 1.2(1−hR), whih aording to simulations
presented in Paper I is suient to onvine the targeted
agent. The simulations rereate thus observations from
real life, where dediated, lose relationships of average
people are suient to establish small but loyal groups of
supporters. As long as the threshold t is large enough to
ensure the onversion of the targeted agent, the support
4fration f is simply given by the number of agents the
leader has resoures for. For large range of values of sRL
the growth of f is linear, reahing 1 when the resoures
allow to ontat everyone in the population.
For mixed strategies, we did not observe any new or
interesting phenomena. Apart from the small group of
diretly inuened agents, the support fration behaved
exatly in the same way as in traditional model.
Summarizing the eets of direted resoures strate-
gies, one an state that they prove themselves in inu-
ening and onverting this part of the population that
they are aimed at, but hardly matter for the rest of the
soiety.
3. STRATEGIES WITH RESOURCE TRANSFER
As we have shown, for large populations, the ability
to ensure the onvition of a part of the population,
does not bring out results going beyond the diretly ap-
proahed part of population. The reason is quite simple:
due to enormous asymmetry between the soial impat
of the leader and individual impats of any of the other
players (with the ratio given by Ns¯), even targeting the
most onneted or the strongest agents does not produe
enough momentum for the leader's ause. The inuene
of a single non-leader agent is simply too small.
Let's onsider now a new approah, allowing for en-
tirely new kind of strategy. In the new model, the leader
an not only diret his resoures at will to inuene ho-
sen groups of agents, but also an transfer some of
the resoures at his disposal to seleted agents. This
would orrespond to, say, establishing loal headquarters
of leader's party, with loal media funds or to invest-
ment in training of leader's representatives, who would
then `substitute' for the leader himself. The question that
arises is: an the leader by suh proedure of distributing
his resoures inrease the rate of onvition and ahieve
the state of global supportiveness faster or heaper?
The strategy of the leader is desribed through a sin-
gle parameter NCL  number of agents that the leader
wants to turn into o-leaders of his ause. The amount
of the resoures needed to ensure the support of the o-
leaders is deduted from the total resoures W , and the
remainder is divided, for example equally, among the
group of newly formed o-leaders (inluding the leader
itself). The soial inuene on other agents is then al-
ulated in the way similar to the traditional strategy de-
sribed in previous setion, but for every o-leader sepa-
rately.
One an expet, that due do the hoie of the agents
that form the o-leader team (for example the most
highly onneted agents, whose proximity to any other
agent is omparatively small) the ombined eet of the
same amount of resoures WR, applied through multiple
ators would be muh more eetive than the ase of the
single leader. This is indeed observed: for a given hR,
the threshold of the transition to supportive state, s∗L is
shifted to smaller values.
Figure 2 ompares the fration f of agents support-
ing the leader as funtion of sRL (whih is a onvenient
way of presenting the resoures available to the leader,
sRL = W
R/N , diretly omparable to traditional model).
The results were alulated for a given value of unfavor-
able external onditions (hR = −1.5), and for random
initial opinion distribution (σ = 0). The network used
has the Albert-Barabási topology, with the leader in ran-
dom position. The three sets of results orrespond to
three values of the number of o-leaders NCL. We om-
pare the results with the simulations in traditional model,
for the leader in a random position, and for the leader in
the most highly onneted positon.
As noted in Paper I, due to enormous dierene be-
tween the number of onnetions for typial agent and
for the highly onneted (HC) agents, there is signiant
dierene in the threshold value of the leader strength s∗L
at whih the population reahes supportive state. The
advantage of starting from highly onneted position is
obvious. Our new resoure transfer model allows the typ-
ial agent  one it has appropriate resoures  to ob-
tain results similar to those `reserved' for the HC leaders
in traditional model.
Figure 3 presents the values of the threshold strength
s∗L as funtion of the number of o-leaders hosen by the
original, randomly plaed leader to help him. We present
results for bot random (unbiased σ = 0) and negatively
biased (σ = −1) starting onditions. In both ases one
an determine a range of values of NCL for whih the
ooperation results in far better results tahn in the tradi-
tional model. The horizontal lines orrespond to thresh-
old values for the traditional model for the same random
leader position and for the most highly onneted leader.
For the ase of random initial opinion, proper hoie of
o-leaders, their onversion and later distribution of re-
soures results in eetive hange of the threshold almost
to the value obtained for the best onneted leader posi-
tion.
It is interesting to note, that if initially leader is in the
highest onneted position, appliation of our strategy
does not bring visible improvement. Any o-leader would
have less optimal position than the original one, thus
multipliation of the number of hannels to an average
agent does help the leader's ause.
Another interesting appliation of the resoure-transfer
strategy is the nearest neighbour (NN) network. In Pa-
per I we have shown, that due to the rapid growth of
separations of agents in NN network and its highly lo-
alized nature, the support for the leader grows slowly
and linearly with inreasing sRL . The resoure transfer
model allows the leader to use a new strategy aimed at
eetive shortening of these distanes. The leader an
onvert agents dispersed evenly in the soiety and later
redistribute its resoures to these agents. As the distane
from an average agent to the losest o-leader is now
muh smaller, the soial impat is greater and instead of
the linear growth we observe a faster ramp-up of f as
5funtion of sRL and transition to fully supportive state.
The shape of this ramp-up depends on the number of o-
leaders NCL, examples are presented in Figure 4. As in
the ase of the AB networks, the appliation of the new
strategy leads to easier ahievement of the fully support-
ive state. Figure 5 presents the values of the threshold s∗L
as funtion of NCL for random and negative initial ondi-
tions. Beause the `nature of the task given to o-leaders'
is here dierent from the AB network ase (namely, to
shorten the distanes between leaders and average soiety
members) the optimum values of NCL are dierent, but
the pattern remains similar: appliation of new strategy
has lear advantage for the leader.
There are other situations where appliation of re-
soure transfer strategy would result in immediate im-
provement of the ability to ahieve a supportive state.
Good example is provided by all networks in whih there
are ommuniation bottleneks: regions of networks on-
neted by few links and agents with high `betweenness'.
In suh situation, establishment of `loal representatives'
with appropriate resoures is ruial ondition for su-
ess.
The idea of direted, onentrated appliation of avail-
able resoures and their re-distribution is drawn from real
life examples: from politis to sales ativities. Examples
of `think globally, at loally' are too numerous to present
here. We think that our model, simple as it is, oers a
framework for the analysis of real-life opinion formation
extending signiantly beyond the traditional approah.
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ompared to traditional models. Albert-Barabási network, h
R = −1.5, t = 1.2∗(1−hR), average σ = 0,
leader in randomly hosen position.
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Figure 3: The resaled leader threshold strength value s∗L at whih the soiety reahes fully supportive state, as funtion of
the number of o-leaders in strategy with resoure transfer. Albert-Barabási network, hR = −1.5, t = 1.2 ∗ (1 − hR). Upper
panel: random initial distribution of σi, lower panel disadvantageous starting ondition σi ≡ −1. Horizontal lines show the
threshold values for traditional simulations (with onstant leader strengh) for leader in random position and in the most highly
onneted position.
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Figure 4: Support fration f as funtion of leader strength sRL for the strategy with resoure transfer for three values of the
o-leader number NCL, ompared to traditional models. Nearest Neighbour network, h
R = −1.5, t = 1.2 ∗ (1 − hR), average
σ = 0, leader in randomly hosen position.
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Figure 5: The resaled leader strength value s∗L at whih the soiety reahes fully supportive state, as funtion of the number of
o-leaders in strategy with resoure transfer. Nearest Neighbour network, hR = −1.5, t = 1.2 ∗ (1− hR). Upper panel: random
initial distribution of σi, lower panel disadvantageous starting ondition σi ≡ −1.
